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I.

INTRODUCTION

The right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him
or her is among the most basic protections guaranteed by the
1
United States Constitution. But under certain circumstances, the
† J.D. Candidate 2007, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., 2004, Political
Science and Psychology, University of Minnesota.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In United States v. Burr, Chief Justice John
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constitutional right to cross-examine one’s accuser conflicts with
2
other valuable societal interests.
In State v. Bobadilla, the
Minnesota Supreme Court confronted just such a situation. Faced
with the prospect of creating substantial barriers to the prosecution
3
of child sexual abuse, the Minnesota Supreme Court narrowly
interpreted the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
4
Crawford v. Washington to allow the introduction of certain hearsay
5
statements made by young children to child protection workers.
By permitting the use of such statements, the court undercut the
basic principles of the Sixth Amendment as defined in Crawford.
This case note first explores the changing constitutional
standards by which courts approach the Confrontation Clause, with
particular emphasis on the theory underlying the right of
6
confrontation. It then details the facts and procedural history of
7
Bobadilla, and highlights a number of inadequacies in the court’s
8
reasoning. Next, it argues that Bobadilla establishes a framework
9
that is inconsistent with Crawford. This note then suggests an
alternative approach that courts should utilize when considering
the admissibility of statements made during child assessment
10
interviews. Finally, this note briefly considers the possibility that
factors other than legal precedent may have motivated the court’s
11
decision.
II. HISTORY
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions . . . the accused shall

Marshall, then presiding over a Federal court in the state of Virginia, wrote in
reference to the right of confrontation, “I know of no principle in the preservation
of which all are more concerned.” 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,694).
2. 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006).
3. See Matthew M. Staab, Comment, Child’s Play: Avoiding the Pitfalls of
Crawford v. Washington in Child Abuse Prosecution, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 501, 503
(2005) (noting that successful sexual abuse prosecutions often require admission
of a child’s out-of-court statements).
4. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 257.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part IV.B.3.
11. See id.
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enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
12
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
him.”
interpreted the Sixth Amendment as expressing a preference for
13
face-to-face confrontation through the right of cross-examination.
As early as 1895, the Court spoke of “compelling [a witness] to
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
14
and judge by his demeanor . . . whether he is worthy of belief.”
The Court also noted that “general rules of law of this kind,
however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused,
must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and
15
the necessities of the case.” Indeed, the Court has recognized that
an absolute bar to admission of hearsay evidence, absent
confrontation, could seriously impede governments’ ability to
16
promote public safety and effective law enforcement.
A. Pre-Crawford Case Law
Courts have been forced to confront the inherent conflict
between the plain language of the Sixth Amendment and the
practical difficulties associated with rigid adherence to the

12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847–48 (1990) (recognizing that
although out-of-court statements may be admitted against a defendant, there has
always been a preference to provide the accused an opportunity to confront the
declarant at trial); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (stating that
“[w]e have never doubted . . . that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
fact”).
14. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895). The Court noted
that the primary object of the Confrontation Clause was to prevent the use of
depositions and ex parte affidavits against criminal defendants in lieu of personal
examination and cross-examination. Id. at 259.
15. Id. More recently, the Court noted that “in certain narrow circumstances,
‘competing interests, “if closely examined,” may warrant dispensing with
confrontation at trial.’” Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 848 (1990) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980)).
16. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (noting that the strong interest in effective law
enforcement and precise evidentiary rules may warrant dispensing with
confrontation at trial in certain circumstances). See also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 813–14 (1990) (recognizing that the Confrontation Clause has never been
strictly interpreted as barring all hearsay statements); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (stating that “the right to confront and to cross-examine may
. . . bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process”);
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that the rights of the public should not be sacrificed to give an incidental
benefit to the accused).
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Confrontation Clause. Prior to Crawford, such questions were
17
controlled by the framework established in Ohio v. Roberts, which
laid out two general restrictions on the admission of out-of-court
18
statements used against a criminal defendant. First, the Roberts
standard usually required that prosecutors produce a witness for
19
trial or demonstrate the unavailability of the witness. Second, the
unavailable witness’s statement must possess sufficient “indicia of
20
The Court said statements either falling within a
reliability.”
21
firmly rooted hearsay exception or containing “particularized
22
guarantees of trustworthiness” were reliable.
The Court elaborated further on the “particularized
23
guarantees of trustworthiness” standard in Idaho v. Wright, which
involved statements made by a two-and-a-half-year-old child to a
24
In holding the
pediatrician relating to alleged sexual abuse.
child’s statements not to be “particularly trustworthy,” the Court
rejected the trial court’s partial reliance on factors extraneous to
the making of the statement, such as physical evidence of the
25
alleged abuse. Instead, the Court said the “relevant circumstances
include only those that surround the making of the statement and
26
that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.” In order
to satisfy this test, it must be “so clear” that the declarant’s
statement was truthful that the test of cross-examination “would be
27
of marginal utility.”
17. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
18. Id. at 65.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. “Firmly rooted” exceptions must be long-standing and have such special
guarantees of credibility as to be “essentially equivalent to, or greater than, those
produced by the Constitution’s preference for cross-examined trial testimony.”
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 126 (1999).
22. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
23. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
24. Id. at 808–09.
25. Id. at 826. The Court expressed concern that the use of corroborating
evidence to support a hearsay statement could lead to admission of unreliable
statements by “bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence . . . .” Id. at
823.
26. Id. at 819. Justice Kennedy argued in dissent that “[i]t is a matter of
common sense for most people that one of the best ways to determine whether
what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence.”
Id. at 828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 820. The Court also rejected the defendant’s contention that a
victim’s out-of-court statements are per se unreliable if the victim has been found
incompetent to testify at trial. Id. at 824. Although the Court said such a finding
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28

Applying this rationale in White v. Illinois, the Court held that
a child’s out-of-court statements made to a police officer and
doctor about alleged sexual abuse, which fell within Illinois’s
medical diagnosis and spontaneous declaration hearsay exceptions,
29
were admissible even if the child was available to testify.
The
Court said that because the statements qualified for admission
under a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception, cross-examination was
30
unlikely to add to the reliability of the testimony. Specifically, the
Court noted that statements made in the course of receiving
medical care provide substantial guarantees of trustworthiness that
31
are unlikely to be replicated by courtroom testimony. According
to the Court, an unavailability rule would “do little to improve the
accuracy of fact-finding” while “significantly burdening the fact32
finding process.” The Court said that “exclud[ing] such probative
statements under the strictures of the Confrontation Clause would
be the height of wrongheadedness, given that the Confrontation
Clause has as a basic purpose the promotion of the ‘integrity of the
33
factfinding process.’”
is relevant to whether a hearsay statement possesses particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness, a per se rule of exclusion would frustrate the truth-seeking purpose
behind the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 825.
28. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
29. See id. at 356.
30. Id. at 357 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990)).
31. Id. at 356. Commentators have criticized the admission of a young child’s
statements under the medical diagnosis exception on the ground that young
patients often fail to understand the physician’s role and thus do not appreciate
the importance of being truthful. Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who
Believe the Children?: The Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception
Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 233–34 (1995). Since the rationale behind the
medical diagnosis exception is the declarant’s self-interest in receiving appropriate
medical care, a declarant’s inability to comprehend the purpose of a statement to
a medical professional would negate the inherent reliability of the statement. Id.
See also Krista MacNevin Jee, Comment, Hearsay Exceptions in Child Abuse Cases: Have
the Courts and Legislatures Really Considered the Child?, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 559, 569
(1998) (arguing that because a child may not appreciate the consequences of a
false statement to a doctor, it cannot be assumed that the medical diagnosis
exception applies to all children).
32. White, 502 U.S. at 355. The Court noted that an unavailability rule would
require prosecutors to continuously locate and keep available each declarant, even
when neither party has an interest in calling the witness to the stand. Id.
33. Id. at 356–57 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988)). The Court
also rejected an argument advanced by the United States as amicus curiae that the
Confrontation Clause was designed primarily to prevent the prosecution of
defendants through the presentation of ex parte affidavits. Id. at 352. Under such
a theory, the Confrontation Clause would only apply to “those few cases where the
statement sought to be admitted was in the character of an ex parte affidavit, i.e.,
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B. Tender-Year Statutes
Around the time the Supreme Court decided Roberts, the
problem of child sexual abuse began to receive increased public
34
attention.
Citizens demanded legislative reforms designed to
35
protect children and lock up those who perpetrate sexual abuse.
Many state legislatures responded by passing tender-year statutory
hearsay exceptions, which provided for the admission of certain
36
hearsay statements made by children in sexual abuse cases.
Consistent with Roberts, most tender-year statutes conditioned the
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay on a finding that
statements possessed sufficient “indicia of reliability,” and many
37
required corroborative evidence of the act.
Minnesota’s tender-year statute permits the introduction of
out-of-court statements made by children under the age of ten
relating to acts of sexual or physical abuse if certain requirements

where the circumstances surrounding the out-of-court statement’s utterance
suggest that the statement has been made for the principal purpose of accusing or
incriminating the defendant.” Id. According to the Court, the government’s view,
which would essentially eliminate the Sixth Amendment’s role in restricting the
admission of hearsay testimony, “is foreclosed by . . . prior cases” and “comes too
late in the day to warrant reexamination of this approach.” Id. at 352–53. Justice
Thomas’s concurrence suggested that “[t]his interpretation is in some ways more
consistent with the test and history of the Clause than our current jurisprudence,”
but cautioned that “[a]ttempts to draw a line between statements made in
contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the
courts in a multitude of difficulties.” Id. at 364.
34. See Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Shallow Words for the
Falsely Accused in a Criminal Prosecution for Child Sexual Abuse, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L.
REV. 175, 178–79 (1991) (describing a “public outcry for legislative reforms” with
regard to child sexual abuse in the late 1970s and early 1980s). Public attention
was, and still is, much needed. Experts estimate that twelve percent of the 100,000
to 500,000 cases of child abuse that occur each year involve sexual abuse. Id. at
178.
35. Id. at 178–79.
36. Marks, supra note 31, at 236–37.
37. Id. at 241–42. Most states that passed statutory tender-year exceptions
permitted the introduction of a child’s otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements
if: (1) the child was under a particular age, usually ten to thirteen years old; (2)
the adverse party had notice; and (3) the child either (a) testified or (b) was
unavailable and there was corroborative evidence of the act. Id. at 238–40. See,
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (2004). A few states required that the
child: (1) be available to testify; or (2) was subject to cross-examination at the time
he or she made the statement. Marks, supra note 31, at 239. See, e.g., TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 (Vernon 2005) (tender-year exception applicable
only if the child testified or was available to testify).
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38

are satisfied. First, the child must either testify at the proceeding,
or the child must be unavailable to testify while corroborative
39
evidence is available to support the allegation. Second, the court
must hold a hearing and find that the circumstances of the child’s
40
statements offer “sufficient indicia of reliability.” The statute also
expressly states that video, audio, or other recorded statements are
41
admissible if the other requirements of the statute are satisfied.
Thus, prior to Crawford, a child’s statements implicating a
defendant in a sexual abuse case were often admissible if the
statements either fell within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or
42
possessed some “indicia of reliability.” Although such a minimal
43
standard alarmed some legal commentators, the approach
44
lessened the burden on prosecutors. Even if a child was declared
incompetent to testify, the child’s statements were usually
admissible if prosecutors could show the statements fell within a
“firmly rooted” hearsay exception or possessed “indicia of
45
reliability.”
C. A New Standard: Crawford v. Washington
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v.
46
Washington dramatically changed the constitutional standard by
47
which courts view the admission of out-of-court statements. In
Crawford, the State of Washington introduced out-of-court
38. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 3 (2004).
39. See id. at subdiv. 3(b).
40. See id. at subdiv. 3(a). The statute specifies that “the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement and the reliability of the person to whom the
statement is made” must “provide sufficient indicia of reliability.” Id. This
standard is consistent with the constitutional standard explained in Idaho v. Wright.
See 497 U.S. 805, 813–15 (1990).
41. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 3 (2004). Prosecutors must also give notice
of intent to offer the statement so as to provide the defendant an “opportunity to
prepare to meet the statement.” See id. at subdiv. 3(c).
42. See Staab, supra note 3, at 507.
43. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay
Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
691, 693 (1993); Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the
Confrontation Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258, 1260 (2003).
44. See Staab, supra note 3, at 507; see also Marks, supra note 31, at 216
(arguing that prosecutors often prefer to use hearsay evidence because juries may
be more willing to accept a child’s out-of-court statements as true).
45. Staab, supra note 3, at 507.
46. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
47. Staab, supra note 3, at 501–02.
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statements made by the defendant’s wife that tended to contradict
48
The Court reversed the
the defendant’s self-defense claim.
defendant’s conviction, and in the process overturned the previous
49
Roberts regime.
The Court rejected Roberts’s focus on the
reliability of a statement, saying that the Confrontation Clause is a
50
“procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.” As such, the
Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed . . . by testing in the crucible of cross51
examination.”
The Court indicated that the history and plain language of the
Confrontation Clause implied a heightened concern with out-of52
court statements that are “testimonial” in nature. The Court held
such statements were admissible only if the declarant was
unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to
53
cross-examine. As for nontestimonial statements, the Court was
54
initially unclear, although subsequent case law indicates that
nontestimonial hearsay is not subject to any constitutional
55
restrictions.
48. 541 U.S. at 40. The defendant’s wife was unavailable to testify because of
Washington’s marital privilege. Id. The trial court permitted the prosecution to
introduce the wife’s tape-recorded statements after holding that the statements
bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. The Washington Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction after concluding that the statements failed to
offer sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. at 41. The Washington Supreme
Court reinstated the conviction, saying that the statements did in fact contain
“guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id.
49. Id. at 66, 68–69.
50. Id. at 61.
51. Id. The Court also noted that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty.” Id. at 62.
52. Id. at 51.
53. Id. at 61.
54. The Court wrote, “Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their
development of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that
exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.” Id. at
68.
55. Although the constitutional standard applied to nontestimonial
statements was initially uncertain, the United States Supreme Court in Davis v.
Washington indicated that the Sixth Amendment no longer restricted the use of
nontestimonial hearsay at trial. 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2274–75 (2006). Specifically, the
Court wrote, “It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from
other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence,
is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 2273. After noting that the
Confrontation Clause is concerned with testimonial hearsay, the Court wrote that
“[a] limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss2/7

8

Everson: Criminal Law-Conflicting Values: Confrontation Rights in Sexual A
7. EVERSON - RC.DOC

2007]

3/7/2007 1:04:24 PM

CONFRONTATION AND BOBADILLA

661

The Crawford Court declined to precisely define what
56
constitutes a testimonial statement. The Court did say that, at a
minimum, testimonial statements included prior formal testimony
57
and police interrogations. It added that “[a]n accuser who makes
a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a
sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance
58
does not.” Crawford also stressed the concern held by the Framers
of the Constitution regarding statements made with the
“[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of
59
testimony with an eye toward trial,” which present a “unique
60
The lack of a precise
potential for prosecutorial abuse.”

fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.” Id. at 2274. In
other words, nontestimonial statements fall outside the “perimeter” of the
Confrontation Clause. Consequently, Sixth Amendment restrictions do not apply
to them. James J. Duane, The Cryptographic Coroner’s Report on Ohio v. Roberts,
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2006, at 37–38. Despite this language, a number of courts have
continued to apply Roberts to nontestimonial hearsay. Id. See, e.g., State v. Blue,
717 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 2006) (arguing that “[t]he reliability and
trustworthiness factors are still to be used for nontestimonial statements”). Other
courts have recognized that nontestimonial statements are no longer subject to
the Roberts reliability test. See, e.g., United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 665 n.2
(7th Cir. 2006) (stating, in dicta, that Davis appears to “[hold] that nontestimonial
hearsay is not subject to the Confrontation Clause”).
56. 454 F.3d at 665 n.2. Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in White v.
Illinois indicated that courts may have difficultly articulating a precise definition of
which statements are made in contemplation of a legal proceedings. 502 U.S. 346,
364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). In White, Justice Thomas wrote:
Attempts to draw a line between statements made in contemplation of
legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a
multitude of difficulties. Few types of statements could be categorically
characterized as within or without the reach of a defendant’s
confrontation rights. Not even statements made to the police or
government officials could be deemed automatically subject to the right
of confrontation (imagine a victim who blurts out an accusation to a
passing police officer, or the unsuspecting social-services worker who is
told of possible child abuse).
Id.
57. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). The Court indicated
that various definitions of “testimonial statements” exist. One is “ex parte in-court
testimony or its functional equivalent.” Id. at 51. Another is “formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions.” Id. at 51–52 (quoting White, 502 U.S. 346, 365). Yet another is
“statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial.” Id. at 52.
58. Id. at 51.
59. 541 U.S. at 56 n.7.
60. Id.
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definition has left lower courts with the task of deciding which
statements qualify as testimonial.
D. Minnesota Case Law
The Minnesota Supreme Court first considered the question
61
in State v. Wright, which involved statements made by two domestic
62
abuse victims to a 911 operator and responding police officers.
The court provided a non-exclusive list of factors to weigh in
determining whether a statement made to law enforcement is
testimonial, including the purpose for making the statement, law
enforcement’s intention in speaking with the declarant, and the
63
level of formality associated with the conversation. In applying
these factors, the court noted that the responding police officers
interviewed the declarants shortly after the incident, and at a time
when police were still ascertaining exactly what happened and
64
whether there was still danger. Although the police officers took
61. 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 2979 (2006). Shortly
after the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Bobadilla, 709
N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006), the United States Supreme Court vacated Wright and
remanded to the Minnesota Supreme Court for further consideration in light of
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2979 (2006). In Davis, the defendant’s girlfriend
called 911 to report that the defendant was physically attacking her. 126 S.Ct.
2266, 2271 (2006). The defendant fled the scene shortly after the call began, and
the operator continued asking the caller questions about the defendant’s identify.
Id. The Court noted that once the defendant left the scene, the emergency
apparently ended. Id. at 2277. The Court held that any statements made by the
caller to the 911 operator after the defendant fled “were testimonial, not unlike
the ‘structured police questioning’ that occurred in Crawford.” Id. The Court
considered those statements made before the defendant fled the scene, and hence
while there was still an ongoing emergency, to be nontestimonial. Id. Along with
Davis, the Court also decided a companion case, discussed infra note 122,
involving statements made by domestic abuse victims to law enforcement.
62. 701 N.W.2d at 806–08.
63. Id. at 812–13. Specifically, the considerations articulated by the court in
determining whether a statement is testimonial are:
(1) whether the declarant was a victim or an observer; (2) the declarant's
purpose in speaking with the officer (e.g., to obtain assistance); (3)
whether it was the police or the declarant who initiated the conversation;
(4) the location where the statements were made (e.g., the declarant's
home, a squad car, or the police station); (5) the declarant's emotional
state when the statements were made; (6) the level of formality and
structure of the conversation between the officer and declarant; (7) the
officers' purpose in speaking with the declarant (e.g., to secure the scene,
determine what happened, or collect evidence); and (8) if and how the
statements were recorded.
Id.
64. Id. at 813–14.
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notes of the interview and used those notes to refresh their
recollections at trial, the court held the statements were
nontestimonial, saying that a reasonable person in similar
circumstances “would not make statements in contemplation of a
65
trial.”
66
In State v. Scacchetti, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
considered statements made by a three-year-old child to a nurse
67
The court
practitioner without law enforcement involvement.
held the child’s statements were made for purposes of medical
68
diagnosis, and thus were nontestimonial.
Similarly, in State v.
69
Krasky, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed a district court
order suppressing statements made by a seven-year-old child to a
70
nurse practitioner.
Although a police detective observed the
interview, the court held that a reasonable child of the victim’s age
would not believe the statements would be available for trial, and
71
thus the statements were nontestimonial.
E. Other Jurisdictions
Other jurisdictions have also recognized that certain
statements made by young children relating to sexual abuse are
nontestimonial. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that a fouryear-old child’s statement to a physician indicating that the
72
defendant molested her was nontestimonial. The court based its
holding largely on the medical purpose of the physician’s interview
with the child and the lack of government involvement in the
73
initiation or course of the examination. The decision also rested

65. Id. at 814.
66. 690 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 711 N.W.2d 508 (Minn.
2006).
67. Id. at 394.
68. Id. at 396.
69. 696 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d on remand, 721 N.W.2d 916
(Minn. App. 2006).
70. Id. at 820. Eight months after the Minnesota Supreme Court decided
Bobadilla, the court of appeals reconsidered Krasky and concluded the statements
were testimonial. 721 N.W.2d at 924. The court cited subsequent state and
federal case law in justifying its holding and noted that the nurse practitioner was
“acting in concert” with government investigators when conducting the interview.
Id. at 923.
71. Krasky, 696 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d on remand, 721
N.W.2d 916.
72. State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 293 (Neb. 2004).
73. Id. at 291.
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upon the lack of any indication of a purpose to develop testimony
74
for trial.
The Washington Court of Appeals similarly held that
statements made by a four-year-old child to a family physician were
75
nontestimonial.
The court said there was no indication of a
purpose to prepare testimony for trial, and it also noted that the
circumstances would not lead a reasonable observer to conclude
76
the physician was attempting to elicit statements for use at trial.
But the Maryland Court of Appeals held that statements made
by an eight-year-old and a ten-year-old to a social worker were
testimonial, partly because the social worker took the statements in
77
the course of a joint investigation with local law enforcement. A
police detective was present at each of the two interviews, and both
children indicated their knowledge that the interview resulted from
78
accusations against the defendant.
In determining that the
statements were testimonial, the court asked whether an objective
declarant would reasonably believe her statements would be
79
available for use at trial.
Although courts must decide each case on its own facts, before
Bobadilla, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not yet addressed the
impact of Crawford on prosecutors’ attempts to introduce
statements made by young children. The atmosphere was ripe for a
decision considering when a young sexual abuse victim’s statements
are testimonial.
III. THE BOBADILLA DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
On the evening of May 4, 2003, three-year-old T.B. returned to
his mother’s care after spending a weekend with his father, who
80
resided with twenty-three-year-old defendant Orlando Bobadilla.
Upon noticing redness on T.B.’s buttocks, T.B.’s mother asked T.B.

74. Id.
75. State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
76. Id.
77. State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 325 (Md. 2005).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Minn. 2006). T.B.’s father is
Orlando Bobadilla’s brother. Id.
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81

about the cause of the discoloration. T.B. initially hesitated, but
eventually he stated that “Uncle Orlando” had inserted his finger
82
into T.B.’s “booty.”
T.B.’s parents brought him to the hospital where an
emergency room physician noted abnormal erythema, or redness,
around T.B.’s rectum, which was consistent with the events T.B.
83
described. The Willmar Police Department took an assault report
at the hospital and forwarded the report to the Kandiyohi County
84
Family Service Department.
A child protection worker from
Kandiyohi County attempted to contact T.B.’s mother over the
next several days by telephone but did not reach her until five days
85
later. The child protection worker arranged to interview T.B. at
86
the local law enforcement center.
The child protection worker and an out-of-uniform Willmar
Police detective met with T.B. and his family later that day at the
87
law enforcement center.
The meeting took place in a “childfriendly” room equipped with a video camera that recorded the
88
interview from behind a one-way mirror. The child protection
worker conducted the interview while the police detective observed
89
The child protection worker used an
from across the room.
interviewing technique known as the “CornerHouse protocol,”
which was developed specifically to interview children who have
90
been victims of sexual abuse.
The CornerHouse protocol is
designed to elicit accurate information about alleged abuse by
directing interviewers to ask nonleading questions in a
91
nonsuggestive manner.
After asking several preliminary questions, the child protection
worker specifically asked T.B. if anybody hurt his body, to which

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 246–47.
85. Id. at 247.
86. Id.
87. Id. The interview took place on May 9, 2003. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The CornerHouse protocol requires the interviewer to
rapport with the child, determine the child’s terms for parts of the
ascertain whether abuse occurred, and close with a safety message.
interview is to progress quickly due to the short attention span of most
Id.
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92

T.B. responded affirmatively. When asked who hurt his body, T.B.
93
Further questioning revealed that
stated, “Orlando did.”
94
Bobadilla penetrated his finger into T.B.’s buttocks.
T.B.
indicated the alleged abuse occurred in his father’s bedroom while
his father was downstairs, although later in the interview T.B.
95
responded “yeah” when asked if his father witnessed the abuse.
The child protection worker also asked T.B. to show her what
96
Although T.B.
happened using an anatomically correct doll.
indicated he would, he ultimately failed to use the doll to
97
demonstrate what occurred.
Bobadilla was charged with first- and second-degree criminal
98
sexual conduct.
At trial, the district court found T.B.
incompetent to testify but permitted T.B.’s mother and the child
protection worker to testify about T.B.’s statements implicating
99
Bobadilla.
The court also allowed the state to introduce the
100
videotape of T.B.’s interview. Based on these statements and the
testimony of the emergency room physician, the jury convicted
101
Bobadilla of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Bobadilla argued on appeal that admission of the statements
made to the child protection worker violated his constitutional
102
right of confrontation.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed
that T.B’s statements to the child protection worker were
92. Id. The child protection worker first asked T.B. about his parents, and
then had T.B. identify his names for various parts of the anatomy using a diagram
of a male. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 248.
First-degree criminal sexual conduct involves sexual
penetration with another person less than thirteen years of age when the actor is
more than thirty-six months older than the complainant. MINN. STAT. § 609.342,
subdiv. 1(a) (2004). Second-degree criminal sexual conduct involves sexual
contact with another person less than thirteen years old when the actor is more
than thirty-six months older than the complainant. MINN. STAT. § 609.343, subdiv.
1(a) (2004).
99. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 248. The court found that the statements were
sufficiently reliable to permit their admission as substantive evidence under
Minnesota’s tender-year hearsay exception, which is codified at Minnesota Statutes
section 595.02, subdivision 3 (2004). Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The district court sentenced Bobadilla to 144 months. Id.
102. Id. The United States Supreme Court decided Crawford while Bobadilla’s
appeal was pending before the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss2/7

14

Everson: Criminal Law-Conflicting Values: Confrontation Rights in Sexual A
7. EVERSON - RC.DOC

2007]

3/7/2007 1:04:24 PM

CONFRONTATION AND BOBADILLA

667
103

testimonial and reversed Bobadilla’s conviction.
The court
expressly found that the interview was conducted to develop a case
104
against Bobadilla, and thus T.B.’s answers were testimonial.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that T.B.’s statements
105
The court based its holding mainly on its
were nontestimonial.
conclusion that T.B.’s statements were not made primarily to
106
preserve testimony for trial.
Consistent with the underlying
107
theme of State v. Wright, the court found the key to determining
whether a statement is testimonial rests on whether the declarant
or government questioner was acting, to a substantial degree, to
108
produce a statement for trial.
The court concluded that the primary purpose of T.B.’s
interview was to establish whether abuse occurred and the steps
109
necessary to protect T.B.’s welfare.
In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied upon the “clearly delineated purpose” behind the
statutory scheme controlling the sexual abuse investigation, which
the majority said was to protect the health and welfare of
110
children.
The court also said that producing statements for
future use at trial was incidental to determining whether abuse
occurred and that T.B.’s young age made it doubtful he
understood that prosecutors might use his statements against the
111
defendant.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Incomplete Reasoning and Misconstrued Facts
Although Bobadilla’s standard for considering the admissibility
of T.B.’s statements was generally consistent with post-Crawford case
103. Id.
104. State v. Bobadilla, 690 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 709
N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006).
105. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 256.
106. Id. at 255–56.
107. State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2979
(2006).
108. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 252–53.
109. Id. at 255–56.
110. Id. at 254–55.
111. Id. at 255–56.
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112

law, the court ultimately erred in finding that the statements were
nontestimonial. The general approach, reflected in Minnesota and
national case law, is to consider whether law enforcement was
involved in the interview, as well as the intention of both the
113
114
questioner and declarant.
After reaffirming this standard, the
court misconstrued the significance of certain factors surrounding
T.B.’s statements to the social worker and police detective. The
ultimate result in Bobadilla established precedent that jeopardizes
115
the fairness of future sexual abuse prosecutions.
1.

Application of Minnesota Statutory Scheme

The court based its conclusion that T.B.’s statements were
nontestimonial in part on a statutory scheme that had a “clearly
delineated purpose . . . to protect the health and welfare of
116
children.”
According to the majority, the statute supported a
finding that government officials obtained T.B.’s statements to
117
protect his welfare, rather than to further criminal prosecution.
But contrary to the majority’s contention, the statutory scheme
indicated that T.B.’s statements were testimonial. The scheme
provided that law enforcement and local welfare agencies were to
coordinate the execution of their investigative and assessment
118
efforts.
It further required that law enforcement prepare a
119
Thus, the statutory
report of the results of its investigation.
scheme mandated that government officials conduct the interview
with T.B. as part of a law enforcement investigation, albeit a joint
120
investigation with child welfare officials.
The statute essentially
dictated the “[i]nvolvement of government officers . . . with an eye
121
toward trial.”
Statements taken under such circumstances fall
122
within the class of statements that Crawford deemed testimonial.
112. See supra Part II.D–E.
113. See supra Part II.D–E.
114. See State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 253–54 (Minn. 2006).
115. Id. at 257.
116. Id. at 254–55.
117. Id.
118. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subdiv. 10(a)(4) (2004).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
122. Id. at 53. The post-Bobadilla U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hammon v.
Indiana, which was decided in tandem with Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2271
(2006), further indicates that T.B.’s statements were testimonial. In Hammon, the
Court held that statements made by a domestic abuse victim to police officers
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A police detective, who generally has an eye towards trial,
was present throughout T.B.’s interview, which took place at a
124
police station.
Although not actively participating, the detective
125
observed the interview and was statutorily required to prepare a
126
Thus, one of the two
report of the results of his investigation.
government officials present for T.B.’s interview was gathering facts
for the purpose of building a criminal case. But the majority failed
to consider the detective when it said that “neither the childprotection worker nor the child declarant, T.B., were acting, to a
127
substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.”
2.

Bobadilla and Snowden

The majority went on to distinguish Bobadilla from Snowden v.
128
State, a Maryland case involving a “statutory interviewing scheme
. . . designed with the express purpose of facilitating the creation of
minutes after an alleged assault were testimonial. Id. at 2280. The Court noted
that the victim made the statements in response to specific police questions
regarding potential past criminal events. Id. at 2278. Davis involved statements
made by a domestic abuse victim during a 911 call. Id. at 2270–71. The Court
held that statements made while the perpetrator was present, and hence while
there was an ongoing emergency, were nontestimonial. Id. at 2277. The Court
concluded that those statements made after the perpetrator fled and the
immediate emergency ended were testimonial. Id. In discussing the impact of
Davis on Bobadilla, the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that, under the analysis
presented in Davis,
the statutory policy for a mandatory ‘investigation’ of child-abuse reports
takes on added importance. It becomes significant that the statute
requires the coordination of investigative efforts with police authorities,
the taking of a single statement in a joint effort of police and other
responsible agencies, and the preservation of a record of the child’s
statements.
State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
123. See Stephanie McMahon, Note, The Turbulent Aftermath of Crawford v.
Washington: Where Do Child Abuse Victims’ Statements Stand?, 33 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 361, 370 (2006) (noting that a police officer’s duty is to investigate crimes for
later prosecution).
124. See supra Part III.A.
125. See supra Part III.B.
126. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subdiv. 10(4) (2004).
127. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2006). The majority’s
conclusion is also directly contradictory to the Minnesota Court of Appeals’
finding that the circumstances surrounding the interview “clearly indicate that the
interview was conducted for purpose [sic] of developing a case against Bobadilla.”
State v. Bobadilla, 690 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 709 N.W.2d
243 (Minn. 2006).
128. Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 39 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), aff’d, State v.
Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005).
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129

out-of-court statements for a future trial.” This, according to the
majority, stood “in contrast” to Minnesota’s statutory interviewing
scheme, which has as a primary purpose the protection of
130
children.
The majority’s reasoning, however, misconstrued the
nature of the statutory schemes involved in Bobadilla and Snowden.
The majority’s characterization of the Maryland statute as
131
being a “statutory interviewing scheme” was misleading. This
supposed “statutory interviewing scheme” was simply Maryland’s
132
tender-year statute,
which provided for the admission of
statements about alleged sexual abuse made by children to various
133
The statute made no
education and social welfare professionals.
mention of an interview or the means by which authorities were to
134
investigate child sexual abuse.
The majority’s description of the
statute as being a “statutory interviewing scheme” wrongly implied
that the scheme controlled how authorities were to interview sexual
abuse victims. Instead, the statute merely established a hearsay
exception for certain statements made by young children relating
135
to alleged sexual abuse.
The majority compared Maryland’s tender-year statute to the
136
But
statutory scheme controlling the investigation in Bobadilla.
the two statutes served entirely different functions in each case.
The court should have compared the statutory scheme controlling
the investigation in Bobadilla with the statutory scheme controlling
the investigation in Snowden.
The sexual abuse investigation in Snowden was controlled in
137
part by a statutory scheme found in the Maryland Family Code.
The scheme required that local child welfare agencies and law
enforcement implement a procedure for conducting joint
138
investigations of sexual abuse.
Although the scheme did not
require authorities to record any interviews, it did mandate that
child protection agencies and law enforcement coordinate their
129. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 255.
130. Id. at 254–55.
131. See id. at 255.
132. Snowden, 846 A.2d at 39, aff’d, Snowden, 867 A.2d 314.
133. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM PROC. § 11-304 (2004). Specifically, the statute
permits introduction of certain out-of-court statements made to physicians,
psychologists, nurses, social workers, or educators. Id. § 11-304(c).
134. Id. § 11-304.
135. Id.
136. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255 (Minn. 2006).
137. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-701–714 (2004).
138. Id. § 5-706(e).
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139

respective investigations so as to minimize harm to the child.
More significantly, the express purpose of the scheme was “to
140
protect children who have been the subject of abuse.”
Thus, the investigations in both Snowden and Bobadilla were
controlled by a statutory framework with an express purpose of
protecting children, which negates the majority’s claim that
Minnesota’s interviewing scheme stood in contrast to the “statutory
141
interviewing scheme” involved in Snowden.
Additionally, the
Bobadilla majority failed to consider that the trial court admitted
142
T.B.’s statements pursuant to Minnesota’s tender-year statute.
The statements in Snowden were similarly admitted pursuant to
143
Maryland’s tender-year statute, which the Bobadilla majority said
“was designed with the express purpose of facilitating . . .
144
If the majority had compared the
statements for a future trial.”
statute under which the statements were admitted in Snowden
(Maryland’s tender-year statute) with the statute under which T.B.’s
statements were admitted (Minnesota’s tender-year statute), the
court would have recognized that T.B.’s statements were admitted
under a statute designed with the express purpose of facilitating
the introduction of statements at trial. In focusing on Maryland’s
tender-year statute and Minnesota’s child abuse investigation
procedures, the majority effectively cherry-picked the relevant
statutory schemes to fit its conclusion that T.B.’s statements were
145
nontestimonial.
Ultimately, there are several facts that distinguish Snowden and
146
Bobadilla. The children in Snowden were older and indicated an
understanding that officials could use their statements in a
147
testimonial manner.
The trial court in Snowden also expressly
found the child welfare officer conducted the interview to preserve
148
statements for trial.
Rather than follow the Maryland court’s
model and carefully weigh the circumstances surrounding T.B.’s
139. Id. § 5-706(f)(2)(ii).
140. Id. § 5-702.
141. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 255
142. Id. at 248.
143. Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 41–42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), aff’d,
State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005).
144. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 255.
145. Id. at 254.
146. Snowden, 867 A.2d at 316. The children in Snowden were eight and ten
years old. Id.
147. Id. at 326.
148. Id.
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statements, the majority in Bobadilla based its conclusion, in part,
on a statutory scheme that does not directly bear on the critical
issue: why did this specific child welfare officer and police detective
interview T.B.?
3.

Bobadilla and Wright

Beyond the “clearly delineated purpose” of the statutory
interviewing scheme, the majority supported its holding by alluding
149
to State v. Wright, which involved statements made during a 911
150
call and to responding officers. The majority in Bobadilla argued
the statements at issue in both Wright and Bobadilla “represent[ed]
a response to a call for assistance and preliminary determination of
151
‘what happened’ and whether there was immediate danger.” The
circumstances of the statements in Wright, however, are significantly
different than those of Bobadilla. In Wright, the court noted the
statements made to responding officers were “nearly
152
contemporaneous” with an emergency call for help.
The
responding officers also lacked details about the emergency
153
situation.
In Bobadilla, on the other hand, T.B.’s statements were made
154
five days after authorities received the initial sexual abuse report,
which is significantly later than the “nearly contemporaneous”
statements in Wright. The police took the preliminary report when
T.B.’s mother initially brought him to the emergency room, and
this report was forwarded to the police detective and child
149. 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006). See supra
note 61.
150. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 254.
151. Id., 709 N.W.2d at 255 (quoting State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 813–14
(Minn. 2005)).
152. Wright, 701 N.W.2d at 813. The analysis in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct.
2266 (2006), suggests that statements made to the responding police officers in
Wright may be testimonial. See supra note 122. In Davis, the Court placed great
importance on the fact that the declarant was describing past events to law
enforcement about an alleged domestic assault. 126 S. Ct. at 2274. Even though
the events took place just minutes earlier and police had to prevent the defendant
from interfering with the discussion between police and the declarant (id. at
2272), the Court held the statements were not given under circumstances
exhibiting an immediate danger. Id. at 2278. Instead, the declarant was
describing past events, indicating that police were not seeking to determine “‘what
is happening,’ but rather ‘what happened.’” Id. Statements taken by law
enforcement under these circumstances are testimonial. Id.
153. Id.
154. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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155

protective officer.
Thus, contrary to the majority’s contention,
the interview with T.B. did not represent a preliminary
determination of what happened. Both the police detective and
child protection worker already had a preliminary report, which
had been produced by a police officer five days earlier. Unlike
Wright, the interview with T.B. was a formal, structured examination
conducted by government officials in response to an initial report
156
of abuse perpetrated by a specific individual.
B. Implications of Bobadilla
Bobadilla established a framework in which defendants are
largely denied the ability to confront statements made under
circumstances that call for close scrutiny by a finder of fact. At the
same time, the decision encourages investigators to manipulate
interviewing conditions to create a nontestimonial appearance so
that prosecutors can use the interview for testimonial purposes.
The ultimate result in Bobadilla established precedent that
endangers the confrontation rights of those accused of sexually
abusing children.
1.

The Need to Scrutinize Child Interview Statements

The Bobadilla majority focused extensively on the need for
157
In
investigators to conduct a single child-assessment interview.
doing so, the majority failed to acknowledge the defendant’s
equally compelling, constitutionally dictated interest in
158
confrontation.
Indeed, the very reason children often cannot
testify reveals the dangers of admitting a child’s out-of-court
159
Commentators have repeatedly recognized the
statements.
155. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
156. The Appellate Court of Illinois held that statements were testimonial in a
similar case involving an interview with a seven-year-old sexual abuse victim. In re
Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). The interview took place at
a child advocacy center one week after the alleged incident. Id. at 186. A social
worker conducted the interview while a police officer observed through a two-way
mirror. Id. The court said the child’s statements were “in response to formal
questioning, with a police officer watching through a two-way mirror,” and thus
were testimonial. Id. at 188.
157. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255 (2006). The court indicated that
avoiding multiple interviews with children reduces trauma for the child and
decreases the chance the child will be confused by suggestive questions. Id.
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
159. See William O’Donohue et al., Forensic Interviews with Children: Lying is Not
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inherent problems associated with over-reliance on a child’s
160
Studies indicate children are susceptible to
statements.
suggestive questioning and often incorporate misleading
161
information into their recollection of an event.
Many young
children consider the “correct” answer to be the response that
162
pleases an adult, which can lead to false reports of abuse if an
163
interviewer is overzealous in his or her questioning.
A child’s
suggestibility indicates a greater need to scrutinize the testimony,
particularly when government officers are involved in procuring
the statements.
The need for scrutiny is further intensified when a child has
the Major Problem, NEV. LAWYER, Oct. 2005, at 28, 32 (discussing the highly
suggestible nature of children and their tendency to give erroneous answers in
response to leading questions).
160. Fitzpatrick, supra note 34, at 200–01; see also Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S.
Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children’s Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV.
181, 185–90 (1986) (arguing that children can accurately recall events but often
inaccurately report information or falsely incorporate details suggested by
interviewers); Marks, supra note 31, at 221–22 (noting that a child’s out-of-court
statements “are particularly susceptible to problems of untrustworthiness”).
161. See Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 160, at 187. See also Dana D.
Anderson, Note, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2117, 1237–38 (1996) (discussing the need to ask “more direct, even
slightly leading” questions to elicit information from children and the
corresponding risk that such questioning will result in inaccurate reporting of
sexual abuse).
162. State v. Storch, 612 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing that a
child’s conception of truth may be what pleases an adult questioner).
163. For an extreme example of how poor interviewing can lead to false
reports of sexual abuse, see State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994). In
Michaels, a day-care teacher was charged with 174 counts of sexual offenses
involving twenty children. Id. at 1375. The investigation began after a three-yearold child had his temperature taken rectally and commented that his teacher did
the same thing to him. Id. at 1374. Investigators with the local police and child
welfare agency repeatedly interviewed a number of children at the day care, often
asking leading questions and providing children details of allegations made by
other children. Id. at 1379–81. The children ultimately reported that the teacher
performed a number of bizarre sexual acts, many of which were largely
unsupported by corroborating evidence. Id. at 1375. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey, in affirming the Appellate Division’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction,
criticized the interviewing techniques used on the children, saying investigators
asked suggestive questions and frequently used positive and negative
reinforcement to elicit desired responses. Id. at 1379–81. The court noted that
interviewers vilified the defendant during interviews with children by saying that
they needed help from “little detectives” to keep the teacher in jail. Id. at 1380.
Some children were even given mock police badges for cooperating. Id. The
court concluded that “the interrogations that occurred in this case were improper
and there is a substantial likelihood that the evidence derived from them is
unreliable.” Id. at 1384.
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been declared incompetent to testify. In Minnesota, a child is
presumed competent to testify unless the judge concludes that “the
child lacks the capacity to remember or to relate truthfully facts
164
respecting which the child is examined.” Considering the district
court’s finding that T.B. was incompetent to testify and the role of
165
government officers in obtaining his statements, a jury should
closely scrutinize T.B.’s testimony. The majority, in allowing for the
admission of T.B.’s untested hearsay statements, failed to even
acknowledge the inherent unreliability associated with such
166
statements or the corresponding risk that untrue statements will
implicate an innocent defendant.
2.

Manipulation of Interviewing Conditions

Bobadilla also established precedent that encourages
government agents to manipulate their procedures to ensure
statements taken during an interview are considered
nontestimonial. Child welfare agencies and law enforcement
officials will likely define their investigative procedures to
guarantee any statements made by children are considered
167
nontestimonial. The American Prosecutors Research Institute
recently noted, after discussing Bobadilla’s reliance on the
nontestimonial purpose of the interview with T.B., that
“[r]egardless of the forensic interviewing protocol utilized, forensic
interviewing professionals should be cognizant of the Court’s
168
language in holding that this interview was nontestimonial.” The
American Prosecutors Research Institute’s statement demonstrates
that public authorities may tailor their interviewing procedures
toward so-called nontestimonial purposes, with police simply
164. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(m) (2004).
165. See supra notes 87–100 and accompanying text.
166. Several of T.B.’s responses during the interview with the child protection
worker demonstrate the importance of scrutinizing a young child’s statements.
T.B. initially indicated that his father was not present when Bobadilla committed
the abusive act. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Minn. 2006). Later in
the interview, T.B. responded “yeah” when asked if his father witnessed the abuse.
Id. Although inconsistent responses of this nature do not indicate T.B.’s
accusations are untrue, they do suggest that under certain circumstances, a child
could provide erroneous information to investigators.
167. The American Prosecutors Research Institute filed an amicus curiae brief
in favor of the State of Minnesota in Bobadilla. 709 N.W.2d at 245.
168. Allie Phillips, A Ray of Hope in the Wake of Crawford v. Washington: An
Analysis of Bobadilla v. Minnesota (pt. 1), APRI UPDATE (Am. Prosecutors Res.
Inst., Alexandria, Va.), Jan. 2006, at 1, 2.
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observing and subtly recording statements for possible use at a later
trial.
A recent Minnesota County Attorney’s Association newsletter
169
illustrates this outcome.
Kandiyohi County Attorney Boyd
Beccue, in discussing the implications of Bobadilla upon future
prosecutions, wrote:
Anyone advising social workers and law enforcement
investigators must carefully review the decision and
incorporate the court’s guidance, giving particular
attention to the discussion of M.S. § 626.556.
It is clear that not only should a police investigator never
be present in the room where a child is being questioned,
the assessment must be carefully designed to meet the
purposes of M.S. § 626.556. . . . I am inclined to believe
that it may even be wise to not have police officers nearby
when the assessment is occurring. It is better to insure
that child protection workers are well trained and
understand the impact of Bobadilla on their
170
investigations.
Prosecutors are discussing ways in which government agencies
should conduct sexual abuse interviews so that statements made by
171
The mere fact that such
victims will be admissible at trial.
discussions are occurring indicates that a primary purpose of many
child assessment interviews is to develop statements for use at a
later trial. Moreover, a prosecutor’s attempt to hide the purpose of
an interview implicates Crawford’s concern about statements made
with the “[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production
of testimony with an eye toward trial” which present a “unique
172
potential for prosecutorial abuse.”
169. Boyd Beccue, State v. Bobadilla: Comments from Kandiyohi County Attorney
Boyd Beccue, THE MONTHLY BRIEF (Minn. County Att’y Ass’n, St. Paul, Minn.), Mar.
2006, at 3, 3.
170. Id.
171. Manipulation of interviewing procedures was a fairly predictable outcome
of the majority opinion, although one must ask whether government
manipulation is a predictable by-product of Crawford’s testimonial—
nontestimonial distinction. Such a question, however, is beyond the scope of this
case note.
172. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2003). The prospect of
prosecutorial abuses is particularly apparent in child sexual abuse cases. District
attorneys often tout successful child sexual abuse prosecutions as part of their
political campaigns. See, e.g., Peter T. Wendel, The Case Against Plea Bargaining
Child Sexual Abuse Charges: Déjà Vu All Over Again, 64 MO. L. REV. 317, 339–40
(1999) (describing how a district attorney used his prosecution of a “‘sicko’ who
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The county attorney newsletter also indicates that a significant
aspect of post-Bobadilla child sexual abuse investigations will be the
173
intentional lack of law enforcement presence at interviews.
Effective criminal investigations usually involve investigators at least
174
Thus, Bobadilla not only
observing an interview with the victim.
created a framework that encourages government agents to
manipulate their interviewing procedures, it also established a
constitutional standard that promotes ineffective investigative
procedures.
Kandiyohi County Attorney Boyd Beccue
acknowledged this point in his comments published in the
Minnesota County Attorney newsletter, writing, “[Bobadilla] leads
us to believe that the less law enforcement involvement with the
assessment, the better. While this places an extra burden on the
child protection worker and may be unsatisfactory to police
investigators, the direction our court has taken regarding what
175
constitutes a ‘testimonial’ statement compels this course.”
3.

An Alternative Approach

Efforts to conceal the motivation underlying child interviews
suggest that courts must carefully scrutinize the circumstances in
which officials elicit information from children. Prosecutors have
expressed the need to conduct interviews in a way that creates the
appearance of a nontestimonial purpose so that prosecutors can
176
Child
use the child’s statements in a testimonial manner.
protection workers are essentially being asked to act as proxies for
law enforcement to ensure a child’s statements are deemed
177
nontestimonial.
Courts consequently cannot view the mere
sexually abuses children” as part of his reelection campaign).
173. Beccue, supra note 169, at 3.
174. JAMES W. OSTERBURG & RICHARD H. WARD, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION: A
METHOD FOR RECONSTRUCTING THE PAST 18, 238 (1992).
175. Beccue, supra note 169, at 3.
176. Id.; Phillips, supra note 168, at 1–2.
177. Justice Page, in dissent, noted that the social worker who interviewed T.B.
was partly acting as a surrogate for the police detective, and suggested that T.B.’s
statements fit well within Crawford’s judgment that statements made in the course
of a police interrogation were testimonial. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243,
257–58 (Minn. 2006) (Page, J., dissenting). Other jurisdictions have found
statements to be testimonial because child protection workers acted as a proxy for
law enforcement. The Illinois Appellate Court held that statements made by a
seven-year-old child to a child-protection worker were testimonial, noting that “if
the State could simply use the surrogate testimony of social workers . . . then
prosecutors would have less motivation” to prepare a child to testify in court. In re
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absence of law enforcement as objective evidence of an interview’s
purpose.
Instead, courts should consider whether investigators
possessed sufficient facts to warrant the presence of law
enforcement at an interview. In other words, did officials have
information, prior to the interview, to justify a criminal
investigation? If so, courts should infer the presence of a police
detective at the interview. Courts must recognize that the lack of
law enforcement at an interview with a sexual abuse victim may
demonstrate forethought on the part of officials to ensure
prosecutors can use the interview against the defendant at trial.
Even under Bobadilla’s narrow standard, statements taken by an
interviewer with the intent to use them at a later trial are
178
testimonial.
Vigorous scrutiny of the purpose behind child protection
interviews will result in courts’ admitting fewer out-of-court
statements made by young children.
It will not, however,
completely foreclose the prosecution of child sexual abuse.
Prosecutors can, for example, introduce nontestimonial statements
made by children, which are no longer subject to any constitutional
179
restrictions. Other potential evidence may also be available, such
T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 802–03 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). In State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349
(Or. 2004), a child-protection worker took over an interview after police were
unable to establish dialogue with a three-year-old child. Id. at 350. The child
protection worker and police detective were investigating the murder of the
child’s two-year-old brother. Id. at 349–50. The child made statements to the
child-protection worker implicating his mother’s boyfriend in the murder, but the
child was later declared incompetent to testify. Id. at 350. The Supreme Court of
Oregon held that the child’s statements were testimonial, saying the child
protection worker was serving as a proxy for the police investigator. Id. at 352.
178. See Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 253. Davis v. Washington reaffirmed the need
to objectively consider the questioner’s intent when weighing whether a statement
is testimonial. 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 (2006).
179. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Use of a child’s out-of-court
statements at trial is still subject to hearsay restrictions. Minnesota’s statutory
hearsay exception permits prosecutors to introduce many nontestimonial
statements made by young children relating to sexual abuse. See supra notes 38–41
and accompanying text. Ironically, Minnesota’s tender-year exception still
includes a provision requiring that the statement possess sufficient “indicia of
reliability,” which essentially mirrors the previous Roberts standard. See supra text
accompanying note 40. In light of precedent implying that nontestimonial
statements are no longer subject to constitutional scrutiny, the legislature is free to
remove the “indicia of reliability” requirement. See Laird Kirkpatrick, Crawford: A
Look Backward, A Look Forward, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2005, at 6, 9–10 (noting that a
decision removing nontestimonial statements from Sixth Amendment scrutiny
would permit legislatures to rewrite hearsay exceptions without concern for
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as testimony from health-care workers relating to physical
symptoms of abuse or incriminating statements made by the
180
defendant.
Officials involved in prosecuting child sexual abuse must also
seek to increase the likelihood that a child is able to testify.
Research indicates that simple steps, such as giving children
courtroom tours and ensuring a support person remains in the
181
courtroom, are associated with reduced stress while testifying.
Allowing the child to testify on closed-circuit television also
decreases anxiety by ensuring the child is not traumatized by
182
encountering the defendant.
For those children declared
incompetent to testify, prosecutors must seek other means to prove
sexual abuse. Although this will interfere with the ability to
prosecute some abusers, admitting a young child’s out-of-court
183
testimonial statements not only degrades the Sixth Amendment,
but it also raises the prospect that juries will convict innocent
defendants.
Unfortunately, a decision barring prosecutors from using
statements made by children during assessment interviews would
result in some abusers not receiving justice. Perhaps it was this
underlying concern that prompted the court to hold that T.B.’s
statements were nontestimonial.
As written, the majority’s
constitutional constraints imposed by Roberts).
180. In Bobadilla, for example, the prosecution could introduce T.B.’s
statements to his mother and the emergency room physician. See Bobadilla, 709
N.W.2d at 246. The physician can also testify about the unusual redness on T.B.’s
buttocks. See id.
181. Gail S. Goodman et al., Innovations for Child Witnesses: A National Survey, 5
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 255, 259 (1999). Among the factors associated with
increased stress on child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are multiple pre-court
interviews, lengthy delays, testimony in the defendant’s presence, multiple
testimonies, and lack of parental support. Id. at 258.
182. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), holding that a child sexual
abuse victim could testify via one-way closed circuit television without violating the
Confrontation Clause. The prosecution and defense counsel conducted the
examination in a separate room while the defendant and jury watched from the
courtroom. Id. at 841. The defendant remained in electronic communication
with defense counsel throughout the examination. Id. at 842. Several postCrawford cases have upheld the constitutionality of closed-circuit television
testimony. See State v. Henriod, 131 P.3d 232, 237–38 (Utah 2006); State v.
Blanchette, 134 P.3d 19, 29 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
183. Justice Page, in dissent, acknowledged that the majority articulated the
importance of protecting children, but recognized that, “[o]n the facts of this
case, that important need conflicts with the Sixth Amendment, which, under our
system of justice, must prevail.” Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 261 (Page, J., dissenting).
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mischaracterization of the relevant statutory scheme and
misapplication of the factual circumstances surrounding the
interview with T.B. are unpersuasive. But considering the horrific
nature of child sexual abuse, it is possible that many will find the
majority’s opinion quite persuasive.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Constitution established a number of
principles that are highly valued in our society. Among those is the
184
right of a criminal defendant to confront his or her accuser.
Bobadilla presented a situation in which the right of confrontation
conflicted with society’s compelling interest in protecting children
from unspeakable crimes. When such conflicts arise, it is the courts
185
that are to ensure constitutional principles prevail.
But in
Bobadilla, the Minnesota Supreme Court largely ignored the
confrontation rights embodied in the Sixth Amendment, choosing
instead to focus on the need to protect children from sexual abuse.
In so doing, the court established precedent that jeopardizes the
fairness of future sexual abuse prosecutions.
Indeed, after
Bobadilla, many sexual abuse trials will present statements made by
young children implicating defendants who will lack any genuine
opportunity to test the reliability of such damning evidence.

184. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
185. Justice Marshall recognized the burden often associated with adhering to
certain fundamental values, writing that “sometimes we must pay substantial social
costs as a result of our commitment to the values we espouse.” United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also U.S. CONST.
amend. VI; Marks, supra note 31, at 210 (noting that those accused of sexually
abusing children “represent an insular minority whose rights must be protected
against the majority”).
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